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Case Comments
Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to Illegal
OSHA Inspections: Savina Home Industries, Inc.
v. Secretary of Labor
Pursuant to the apparent authority granted under section
8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA),' an OSHA compliance officer conducted a warrantless
inspection 2 of a commercial construction site of Savina Home
Industries, Inc. (Savina).3 During this inspection several viola-
tions of OSHA safety regulations were discovered. The Secre-
tary of Labor cited Savina for these violations and proposed
penalties totalling $470.4 After Savina contested the citation,
the Secretary issued a formal complaint.5 The case was heard
before an administrative law judge who declined to hear
Savina's constitutional arguments. 6 The judge affirmed most of
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
2. On its face OSHA does not require compliance officers to procure
search warrants prior to conducting safety inspections on private property.
Section 8(a) of the Act provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in
charge, is authorized-
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory,
plant, establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or
environment where work is performed by an employee of an em-
ployer; and
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at
other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a rea-
sonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent
conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment,
and materials therein, and to question privately any such em-
ployer, owner, operator, agent, or employee.
29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976).
3. Savina, a building firm, was employed as a general contractor. Savina
Home Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1979).
4. Id.
5. Id. The Act requires the OSHA Review Commission to allow a con-
testing employer an opportunity for a hearing. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976). This
hearing must conform with the procedural requirements for adjudicatory hear-
ings set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
See 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976).
6. 594 F.2d at 1360. Savina raised a number of constitutional arguments,
including several claims that OSHA and the acts of the Secretary authorized by
OSHA violated its constitutional right to due process of law, see, id. at 1365-66,
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the citations and ordered that a reduced penalty of $275 be im-
posed.7 The OSHA Review Commission affirmed the adminis-
trative law judge's order.8 Savina appealed this final order to
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,9 contending that the
evidence upon which the order was based was inadmissible be-
cause it was obtained through an illegal search.O While this
appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held in Marshall v.
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to be tried before a jury. See id.
at 1366-67. Savina also argued that OSHA amounted to an unconstitutional del-
egation of legislative and judicial authority and that the Act was unconstitu-
tionally vague. See id. at 1367. Although the court disposed of most of these
claims on grounds of lack of standing, see id. at 1366-67, two due process claims
involving technically deficient notice were denied on substantive grounds. See
id. at 1365-66. Savina's strongest constitutional argument was that the evidence
of its violations was inadmissible because it was obtained through a warrant-
less search in violation of the fourth amendment. See id. at 1361-65.
Although the administrative law judge believed that he lacked authority to
adjudicate the constitutionality of OSHA--"the. very Act that gave [the OSHA
Review Commission] its authority"--see id. at 1360, Savina may have been obli-
gated to give notice of its constitutional arguments by raising them at the ad-
ministrative hearing level in order to raise them before the court of appeals.
OSHA stipulates: "No objection that has not been urged before the Commis-
sion shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such
objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances." 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(a) (1976). See 594 F.2d at 1361 n.3. See generally Divesco Roofing & Insu-
lation Co., [1973-1974] Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH DEc. (CCH) 1 16,443 (OSHA Re-
view Comm'n 1973); see also Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586
F.2d 683, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding "extraordinary circumstances").
In Savina, the Secretary of Labor argued that Savina's fourth amendment
challenge was not properly before the court because Savina failed to raise the
lack of consent issue at the administrative hearing. 594 F.2d at 1361 n.3. The
Tenth Circuit panel, however, dismissed this argument by finding the allegation
that the inspection was conducted in violation of the fourth amendment to be
sufficient. Because OSHA procedures did not allow Savina to fully develop its
argument before the administrative judge, the court found Savina's general ob-
jection at the adminstrative hearing adequate to permit consideration of this
challenge on appeal. Id.
7. 594 F.2d at 1360. The circuit court's opinion does not state the reason
for the reduction in the penalty.
8. Id. at 1360-61. Any member of the OSHA Review Commission has au-
thority to direct that the administrative law judge's order be reviewed by the
full Commission. Administrative Law Judges-Civil Service, Publ. L. 95-251,
§ 2(a) (7), 92 Stat. 183 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1976)). The Commission
has the power to modify, affirm, or vacate the Secretary's citation or proposed
penalty following the initial, fact-finding hearing conducted by the administra-
tive law judge. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1976). If no Commission member directs re-
view of the administrative law judge's order within thirty days, this order
becomes the final order of the Commission. Administrative Law Judges-Civil
Service, Publ. L. 95-251, § 2(a), 7, 92 Stat. 183 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 661(i)
(1976)).
9. Any person adversely affected by an order of the OSHA Review Com-
mission may obtain judicial review in a United States court of appeals by filing
within sixty days a petition that the order be modified or set aside. See 29
U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
10. 594 F.2d at 1361-65. See also note 6 supra.
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Barlow's, Inc.11 that OSHA's warrantless inspection proce-
dures violated the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasona-
ble searches. 12 Although the Tenth Circuit panel ultimately
affirmed the OSHA Review Commission's order on the ground
that any exclusionary rule that might accompany Barlow's was
not retroactively applicable,13 the panel first concluded that the
11. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
12. See id. at 324-325. The Barlow's Court held that "[OSHA § 8(a)] is un-
constitutional insofar as it purports to authorize inspections without warrant or
its equivalent." Id. at 325. See notes 15 & 41 infra and accompanying text. But
see 436 U.S. at 325-339 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun & Rehn-
quist, J.J.).
13. In holding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule would not ap-
ply retroactively, the Tenth Circuit panel employed the test for retroactivity of
extensions of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule announced by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975). See 594 F.2d
at 1363. An earlier, less rigorous, test for the retroactivity of "new doctrines of
law" is still applied in most circumstances. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
296-97 (1967) (stating the traditional standard and citing cases). See generally
Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1557, 1558-67 (1975). Following Peltier, however, it is no longer applied in
retroactivity cases involving the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Under
the Peltier test the extension of the exclusionary rule will apply retroactively
only when one of its two major purposes-the deterrence of similar official mis-
conduct in the future and the preservation of judicial integrity, see notes 51-52
infra-would be significantly furthered by such application. See United States
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 539. The Peltier Court concluded that both of these con-
siderations depend on the good faith of the offending officer and the reasona-
bleness of that faith. Id. at 537. If the officer reasonably believed that his
actions were constitutional, then the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence
will not further the rule's deterrent purpose because the "deterrent purpose
... necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very
least negligent, conduct." Id. at 540 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
447 (1974)). Similarly, judicial integrity would not be offended by the admis-
sion of evidence obtained through good faith searches, because the use of such
evidence does not make the courts "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a
Constitution they are sworn to uphold." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
223 (1960), quoted in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536 (1975). In es-
sence, the "Peltier test" provides that the exclusionary rule is non-retroactive
in fourth amendment cases unless the officers involved in the illegal search
knew or should have known that their actions were unconstitutional. See 422
U.S. at 542. See generally Note, Retroactivity and the Exclusionary Rule: When
do the Policies Underlying the Exclusionary Rule Warrant Its Retroactive Ap-
plication?-United States v. Peltier, 13 AM. Cpm. L. REv. 317 (1975).
Employing the Peltier test for retroactivity, the Tenth Circuit panel con-
cluded that at the time of the inspection in Savina, the state of the law "Was
not such as to charge the inspector with knowledge of the unconstitutionality
of a warrantless search." 594 F.2d at 1364. Once this conclusion of "good faith"
was reached, the Peltier test required that any exclusionary rule demanded by
Barlow's be applied only prospectively.
The Savina court, however, may have misapplied the Peltier definition of a
reasonable basis for a good faith belief by the offending officer in that the ex-
tension of the fourth amendment in Savina was more clearly foreshadowed
than extension in Peltier. In finding a good faith basis for the Border Patrol's
belief in the constitutionality of the roving border search involved in Peltier,
19801
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exclusionary rule would apply to OSHA proceedings violative
the Supreme Court noted that prior to its ruling in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (probable cause held necessary for roving border
searches of vehicles), there had been no federal court decisions indicating that
such searches were impermissible. See 422 U.S. at 540-42. Indeed, all of the ap-
pellate court decisons at the time of the search in Peltier supported the legality
of such a search. See United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459, 460-64 (9th Cir. 1970);
Roa-Rodriques v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206, 1208 (10th Cir. 1969). The only
Supreme Court precedent that supported the contrary view was over fifty years
old and was very specific in its application to such a search. See Carol v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (although the Court held that probable
cause was needed for the search of a car, there was some uncertainty as to its
applicability to border searches). In contrast, at the time of the search involved
in Savina, no appellate court had considered the constitutionality of OSHA's
authorization of warrantless searches. Although the only federal district court
decision that had considered the issue, Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F.
Supp. 1350, 1354 (S.D. Ga. 1974), supported the constitutionality of OSHA's war-
rantless inspections, the rationale of its opinion was severely undermined by
the Supreme Court only one month later. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 863 (1974) (Court approved a warrantless
administrative search, because it fell within a warrant exception, but expressly
reaffirmed certain cases that Buckeye considered to be of no further vitality).
Thus, at the time it concluded its warrantless search of Savina's premises,
the Department of Labor could rely only on the language of section 8(a) of
OSHA, see note 2 supra, and Buckeye, in support of the constitutionality of its
practices. The evidence against a constitutional interpretation was the literal
language of the fourth amendment and the Supreme Court decision that
destroyed Buckeye's precedential foundations. On the basis of this informa-
tion, the Secretary of Labor elected to continue to conduct warrantless
searches under OSHA. On the basis of this same information, however, the
next eight trial judges to consider the issue unanimously agreed that warrant-
less OSHA inspections were unconstitutional. See Barlow's Inc. v. Usery, 424 F.
Supp. 437, 442 (D. Ida. 1977), affd sub nom. Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S.
307 (1978); Marshall v. Reinhold Constr., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 685, 695 (M.D. Fla.
1977); Morris v. Department of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014, 1020 (S.D. Ill. 1977);
Empire Steel Mfg. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873, 881 (D. Mont. 1977); Marshall v.
Chromalloy Am. Corp., 433 F. Supp. 330, 332-33 (E.D. Wis. 1977), affd sub nomL
In re Establishment Inspection of Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 589 F.2d 1335 (7th
Cir. 1979); Usery v. Centrif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959, 960-62 (N.D. Ga.
1977); Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154, 162 (E.D. Tex. 1976),
vacated 589 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1978); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, 418 F.
Supp. 627, 630 (D. N. Mex. 1976). See generally Note, Warrantless Nonconsen-
sual Searches Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 46 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 93 (1977). Although these later rulings were announced after the
OSHA inspection in Savina, and could not have alerted the Secretary to the
probable need for warrants, they weaken any argument that the Secretary re-
lied on clear constitutional law. In light of the near unanimity with which dis-
trict courts anticipated Barlow's, the reasonableness of the Secretary's
assumption that OHSA's warrantless search procedure was constitutional is
open to doubt.
Where such important constitutional principles are at stake, the better ap-
proach may have been to assume that the Department of Labor, which was a
party to all of these cases, had the same foresight as the eight trial judges. Al-
lowing the Department of Labor to find a safe harbor in a single trial court
opinion, as Savina may be taken to imply, would certainly be a step toward
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of the Barlow's standard. Savina Home Industries, Inc. v. Sec-
retary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).14
The most important question considered by the Savina
court was whether the exclusionary rule applies in OSHA pro-
ceedings to evidence obtained in violation of the Barlow's war-
rant requirements.15 This issue has its origins in the fourth
amendment's failure to provide a method to enforce its safe-
guards.16 Although since 1791 the fourth amendment has been
held to guarantee freedom from arbitrary or unreasonable gov-
ernment searches, it fails to provide sanctions when the gov-
ernment violates this right. In the absence of such sanctions,
converting Peltier's already rigorous requirements for retroactivity into a per se
rule of non-retroactivity in fourth amendment exclusionary rule cases.
14. The Tenth Circuit panel undoubtedly asserted this conclusion as a be-
lief rather than a holding because of the Supreme Court's recent directive to
lower courts to attempt to dispose of motions to suppress evidence under the
fourth amendment on grounds of non-retroactivity before considering the mer-
its of a novel exclusionary rule claim. See Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916,
920-21 (1975).
The Savina court's discussion of the applicability of the exclusionary rule
sanctions to evidence obtained in warrantless administrative searches assumes
that the Barlow's constitutional warrant requirement would itself retroactively
prohibit such searches. Because Barlow's was itself a suit for prospective re-
lief (no search had yet taken place), the Supreme Court's opinion in Barlow's
did not indicate whether the Barlow's warrant requirement extended to pre-
Barlow's searches. The Savina court did not decide whether the warrant re-
quirement had such retroactive applicability and noted only that in Todd Ship-
yards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth
Circuit had made such a determination based on the fact that the Supreme
Court had remanded several pending cases for reconsideration in light of Bar-
low's. See 594 F.2d at 1361-62 & n.4.
15. Under the Barlow's requirements, the Secretary of Labor may obtain
an ex parte warrant merely by proving "that reasonable legislative or adminis-
trative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to
a particular [establishment]." 436 U.S. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967)).
To obtain such a warrant, the Secretary need not show probable cause that
OSHA regulations are being violated on the particular premises to be searched.
Id. A nonconsensual OSHA search performed without this ex parte warrant,
however, is prohibited by the fourth amendment. Id. at 325. See generally
Note, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. and the Warrant Requirement for OSHA "Spot
Check" Inspections, 15 IDAno L. REV. 187 (1978); Comment, Searches by Admin-
istrative Agencies After Barlow's and Tyler: Fourth Amendment Pitfalls and
Short-Cuts, 14 LAND & WATER L. REV. 207 (1979); A. Obadal, The Barlow's Deci-
sion: Are Its Guidelines Mere Formalities? (1978) (unpublished study on file at
the National Legal Center, Washington D.C.).
16. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. rV.
1980]
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fourth amendment rights formerly existed more often in word
than in reality.'7 The Supreme Court, however, eventually for-
mulated an exclusionary rule' 8 whereby evidence obtained
through searches or seizures conducted in violation of the
fourth amendment is, with some exceptions, inadmissible. 19
The scope of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule's ap-
plication has not yet been precisely defined. Although it is
clear that the rule applies in criminal trials,20 its applicability in
noncriminal adjudications, such as the administrative hearing
involved in Savina, is unsettled.2 1 The Supreme Court has re-
17. That police practices involving illegal searches and seizures were wide-
spread prior to the formulation of the exclusionary rule may be inferred from
the Supreme Court's reference to "[t]he tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures
and enforced confessions." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). In
view of these police practices the Court has concluded that failure on the part
of the courts to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence would be to "grant
the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment." Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
18. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN Sys-
TEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2184, at 31 (3d ed. 1940); text ac-
companying notes 28-31 infra. The Supreme Court did not explicitly create the
exlusionary rule until Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks the
defendant's home had been ransacked without a warrant by municipal police
assisted by a United States marshall. The evidence from this search was used
to convict Weeks of illegally using the federal mails to send lottery tickets. The
Court excluded the evidence from the trial because of the unconstitutional
means used to obtain it. Id. at 386-89.
Since the fourth amendment was then interpreted by the Court to apply
only to the federal government, the Weeks exclusionary rule applied only in the
federal courts. 232 U.S. 383. See Barton v. Baltimore, 32 U.S (7 Pet.) 243, 247
(1833).
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), however, the Supreme Court held
that the "core" of the fourth amendment was applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 27-28. This meant
that the fourth amendment's restrictions were applicable to state officials. Ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule, however, remained a matter for judicial dis-
cretion in state courts because it was not a constitutional right. Id. at 28-33.
Eventually, in 1961, the Supreme Court held the exclusion of evidence resulting
from violation of the fourth amendment to be required in state courts. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Cases subsequent to Mapp, however, have reas-
serted that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is not a constitutional
right. See note 85 infra.
19. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
20. The Supreme Court's decisions in which the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule has been applied are either criminal cases or cases classified as
quasi-criminal. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443-47 (1976).
21. Compare id. at 447 ("the Court never has applied [the exclusionary
rule] to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state") with notes
36, 102 infra (describing civil applications of the rule). See generally Note, Con-
stitutional Exclusion of Evidence in Civil Litigation, 55 VA. L. REV. 1484 (1969);
Comment, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Cases, 19 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 263 (1967).
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cently applied the warrant requirements of the fourth amend-
ment to administrative inspections conducted by government
agents,2 2 but has not yet ruled whether the exclusionary rule
applies to evidence obtained through such warrantless
searches. 23
Lower courts have often stated that the exclusionary rule
simply does not apply in civil cases.2 4 Yet in two cases involv-
ing civil forfeiture proceedings the Supreme Court has held
inadmissible evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment. The first case, Boyd v. United States,25 decided in
1886, involved a constructive search and seizure of an im-
porter's business records by customs officials. The records
were then used in a civil forfeiture proceeding to prove that the
defendants had attempted to defraud the government of import
duties. 26 The trial court awarded forfeiture of the goods in
question to the government. In reversing, the Supreme Court
justified exclusion of the evidence by comparing civil forfeiture
proceedings to criminal cases. 27 Justice Bradley, for the Court,
stated: "[P]roceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring
the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences commit-
ted by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their na-
22. See See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967). In Camara, the Court overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959), holding that inspections of private residences by administrative agen-
cies must ordinarily be conducted pursuant to a search warrant. 387 U.S at 528.
In See, the Court extended this protection to nonpublic business premises. 387
U.S. at 545-46. See note 15 supra.
In two cases, however, the Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to its
holdings in Camara and See. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (up-
holding a warrantless search authorized under the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976)); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72
(1970) (upholding the warrantless search of the business premises of a liquor
dealer authorized by 26 U.S.C. §§ 5146(b), 7606 (1976)). The Court allowed
these exceptions to the expanded fourth amendment warrant requirements be-
cause the liquor and firearm industries both have a long history of pervasive
governmental regulation. In the Court's view, when a person chooses to engage
in one of these businesses, he has a lesser expectation of privacy. 406 U.S. at
315-16; 397 U.S. at 76-77. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
In Barlow's, however, the Court held that neither the Biswell nor the Colon-
nade exception to the administrative search warrant requirements applied to
OSHA inspections. 436 U.S. at 313-15.
23. Neither Barlow's, nor See, nor Camara, dealt with the question of ex-
cluding evidence obtained by an illegal search.
24. See note 36 infra. See generally secondary sources cited in note 21
supra.
25. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
26. Id. at 618; see note 18 supra.
27. 116 U.S. at 634. In Boyd the government could have sought both crimi-
nal and civil penalties but limited its demand to civil forfeiture of the tax-delin-
quent goods. Id.
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ture criminal."28 The Court's next application of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule in a civil forfeiture case did not
occur until 1965. In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Penn-
sylvania,29 the Court determined that a civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding in rem, against an automobile seized when its owner
was arrested, was actually being brought as an attempt to im-
pose a penalty on the car's owner for the criminal offense of
possessing liquor without proper tax seals.30
Boyd and Plymouth Sedan initiated a "quasi-criminal" doc-
trine3' under which courts apply the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule in civil actions that bear a sufficient similarity to
criminal prosecutions. 32 The full ambit of this doctrine, how-
ever, is far from clear. Although the quasi-criminal doctrine at
its inception was functionally oriented,33 it has generally been
applied on a perfunctory basis without consideration of the
need to protect constitutional interests in facially civil proceed-
ings.34 Perhaps because the Supreme Court has failed to pro-
vide specific guidance on the factors to be considered in
determining whether a civil form of action warrants quasi-crim-
28. Id.
29. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
30. Id. at 700-02. In this case two state law enforcement officers had uncon-
stitutionally searched an automobile and found 31 cases of liquor not bearing
Pennsylvania tax seals. The automobile and liquor were seized; the automo-
bile's owner was arrested. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a petition
for forfeiture of the automobile. The owner sought dismissal of the petition on
the grounds that forfeiture of the automobile depended on the admission of un-
constitutionally seized evidence. Id. at 694-95. Noting that the value of the au-
tomobile in question was twice as much as the maximum fine that was the
criminal penalty for the offense, id. at 700-01, the Court reasoned that it would
undermine the purposes of the exclusionary rule to exclude illegally obtained
evidence in a criminal prosecution only to admit it in a civil proceeding that al-
lowed imposition of a harsher penalty. Id. at 701.
31. See id. at 700. The term was alluded to in Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634 ("suits
for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the
law, are of this quasi-criminal nature").
32. See note 36 infra. One commentator has provided the following defini-
tion of "quasi-criminal":
Laws that provide for punishment but are civil rather than criminal in
form have sometimes been labeled "quasi-criminal" by the Supreme
Court. These laws, broadly speaking, provide for civil money penalties,
forfeitures of property, and the punitive imposition of various disabili-
ties, such as the loss of professional license or public employment.
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitu-
tional Analysis, 60 Mwm. L. REV. 379, 381 (1975) (footnotes omitted), quoted in
Savina Home Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1362 n.6 (10th Cir.
1979).
33. See Clark, supra note 32, at 384; text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
34. See Clark, supra note 32.
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inal treatment,35 lower courts have inconsistently treated cases
involving the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.3 6 The
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Janis,37 a civil for-
35. The two Supreme Court decisions that have dealt with the "quasi-crim-
inal" doctrine in the context of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule have
only discussed the facts then before the Court; neither case provides general
guidance on where to draw the line between the merely "civil" and the "quasi-
criminal" case. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text.
36. Generally, courts have found the exclusionary rule applicable to pro-
ceedings that are quasi-criminal in form. See, e.g., Midwest Growers Coop.
Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 466 (9th Cir. 1976) (rule applicable to prevent
use of illegal evidence by the ICC in a civil suit); NLRB v. South Bay Daily
Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 364 (9th Cir. 1969) (rule available in a quasi-criminal ac-
tion, but a case is quasi-criminal in form only if the government is seeking to
penalize someone), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). Pizzarello v. United States,
408 F.2d. 579, 585-86 (2d Cir.) (tax forfeiture proceeding), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
986 (1969); Knoll Associates v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530, 533-37 (7th Cir. 1968) (FTC
hearing); Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Air Force re-
moval proceeding); Smith v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 794-95 (W.D. Mich. 1975)
(civil rights action: determined exclusionary rule is applicable to college disci-
plinary proceeding); United States v. Blank, 261 F. Supp. 180, 182 (N.D. Ohio
1966) (IRS deficiency assessment proceeding); Lassoff v. Gray, 207 F. Supp. 843,
846-49 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (civil tax assessment); Rinderknecht v. Maricopa County
Employees Merit Sys., 21 Ariz. App. 419, 421, 520 P.2d 332, 334 (dismissal pro-
ceedings), vacated after settlement of case, 111 Ariz. 174, 526 P.2d 713 (1974);
Elder v. Board of Medical Examiners, 241 Cal. App. 2d, 246, 260, 50 Cal. Rptr.
304, 315 (1966) (dictum that exclusionary rule is applicable to a proceeding to
revoke a medical license), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d
670, 680-83 (1966 & Supp. 1979).
Courts have also applied the exclusionary rule in civil cases by interpreting
the exclusionary rule as a constitutional right of the individual and, thus, appli-
cable to both civil and criminal proceedings. In view of recent Supreme Court
decisions, however, see note 85 infra, the premise that the exclusionary rule is
a personal constitutional right seems questionable. See United States v. Mc-
Surely, 473 F.2d 1178, 1193-94 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (legislative hearing cannot order a
witness to testify if questions are based on illegally obtained evidence); Roger
v. United States, 97 F.2d 691, 692 (1st Cir. 1938) (action to recover duties on im-
ported liquor); Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110, 112-13 (D. Mont. 1920), appeal dis-
missed sub noma. Andrews v. Jackson, 267 F. 1022 (9th Cir. 1920) (deportation
hearing); United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 F. 832, 834 (D. Vt. 1899) (de-
portation hearing); Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F. Supp. 835, 840 (N.D. Tex. 1972)
(high school disciplinary hearing).
In contrast, however, there are a series of cases that have ignored the
"quasi-criminal" aspect of the case and have refused to apply the exclusionary
rule. These cases are based on the rationale that the public welfare interest in-
volved outweighs any possible further deterrent effect the exclusionary rule's
application may have. See, e.g., United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (sentencing hearing); United States
v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (2d Cir. 1970) (parole revocation hearing);
In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5, 12 (1976) (proceeding to
declare minor dependent); Governing Bd. of Mountain View School Dist. v.
Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 551, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1974) (proceeding to dis-
miss teacher).
See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZmE § 1.5(3), at 96-102 (1978);
secondary sources cited in note 21 supra.
37. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
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feiture case in which the exclusionary rule was not applied, fur-
ther confuses the issue.38 Janis apparently has led at least one
court to conclude that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
is not applicable in any civil case.39
In view of the confusion over the full scope of the quasi-
criminal doctrine in fourth amendment cases, the exclusionary
rule's applicability to OSHA proceedings remains doubtful.40
Because Barlow's was a pre-inspection suit for injunctive re-
lief,4 1 the Supreme Court did not determine whether evidence
obtained in a warrantless inspection would be admissible in a
subsequent administrative hearing. The only appellate court to
reach this precise question prior to Savina was a panel of the
Ninth Circuit in Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,42
which, without mentioning the quasi.criminal doctrine by
name, characterized OSHA proceedings as civil and concluded
that the exclusionary rule should not be applied to OSHA pro-
ceedings.43
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Savina court
noted the quasi-criminal doctrine embodied in Plymouth Se-
dan44 and observed that "an argument could be made that
OSHA civil penalties constitute quasi-criminal sanctions."4 5
The court also noted that several lower courts have applied the
exclusionary rule in administrative or civil contexts.46 The
court primarily argued, however, that the Supreme Court's ra-
tionale for applying the exclusionary rule to criminal cases
38. See notes 56-63 infra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 42-43 infra and accompanying text.
40. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1139 (3d Cir. 1979)
(declining to express any opinion "on the sharply contested question whether
the exclusionary rule applies to OSHA enforcement").
41. In Barlow's the president of an electrical and plumbing business re-
fused to allow an OSHA compliance officer to inspect the nonpublic area of his
business. He based his refusal on his fourth amendment rights and the compli-
ance officer's failure to obtain a search warrant. 436 U.S. at 309-10. After a fed-
eral district court issued an order compelling Barlow's, Inc. to submit to the
inspection, the president again refused, this time seeking injunctive relief from
such warrantless searches. Id. at 310. The district court held that because the
fourth amendment required a warrant for OSHA inspections, OSHA's statutory
authorization for warrantless inspections was unconstitutional. Barlow's, Inc.
v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1977), aFfd sub nom. Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). See note 12 supra.
42. 586 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1978).
43. Id. at 688-91. See also Meadows Indus., [1979] Occ. SAFETY & HEALTH
DEC. (CCH) 1 23,847 (OSHA REVIEW COMM'N 1979).
44. See 594 F.2d at 1362. See generally text accompanying notes 29-30
supra.
45. 594 F.2d at 1362 n.6.
46. See id. at 1362. See also note 36 supra.
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seemed to require its application whenever the underlying pur-
poses of the rule-deterring official lawlessness and preserving
judicial integrity-would be advanced.4 7 The court emphasized
that these considerations "do not become inconsequential sim-
ply because an illegal search is conducted by the Department
of Labor instead of by the Department of Justice."48
The Savina court's reasoning illuminates a significant in-
consistency in the Supreme Court's application of the quasi-
criminal doctrine in fourth amendment exclusionary rule cases.
In criminal cases involving exclusionary rule issues the
Supreme Court has sought to balance the judiciary's important
truth-finding function and its duty to protect constitutional
rights.49 In criminal cases the Supreme Court has almost inva-
riably favored constitutional rightsO by determining that the
exclusionary rule's deterrent effect outweighs its tendency to
inhibit the discovery of the truth of the contested matter.5 1
47. 594 F.2d at 1362 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
48. Id. at 1363.
49. In 1914, when the Supreme Court formally adopted the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule in federal criminal cases, the Court explained its view
of the balance that must be struck in these words:
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punish-
ment, praiseworthy as they are, are not be be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
In 1961 the Supreme Court favored constitutional rights by extending the
exclusionary rule to a state criminal case. In doing so, the Court noted that
state remedies other than the exclusionary rule had proven to be "worthless
and futile," Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961), and that "we can no longer
permit [the fourth amendment] to remain an empty promise." Id. at 660.
50. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960) (extension of the exclusion-
ary rule to state cases); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (evi-
dence obtained illegally by state officers is inadmissible in federal courts); Rea
v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956) (evidence illegally obtained by federal
officers could not be used in state courts); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
393 (1914) (adoption of exclusionary rule on federal level). Recent Supreme
Court decisions, however, have contained language expressing uncertainty over
the desirability of retention of the exclusionary rule as a feature of criminal
procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 452 n.22 (1976) ("The
final conclusion is clear. No empirical researcher, proponent or opponent of the
rule, has yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has a
deterrent effect even in the situations in which it is now applied.") See also
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ('"The time
has come to modify [the exclusionary rule's] reach, even if it is retained for a
small and limited category of cases."). Despite these reservations, however,
the Court has not yet held the rule inapplicable in the simple case in which un-
lawfully obtained evidence is offered to establish guilt in a criminal trial.
51. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (in holding
that evidence unconstitutionally obtained by state officers was inadmissible in
federal criminal prosecutions, the Court stated, "[the exclusionary rule's] pur-
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These cases indicate that deterrence of official lawlessness is
both the foundation of the rule and a factor of overriding im-
portance in the balancing process. 5 2 In determining whether
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should apply in cases
that are not criminal in form, however, the Court has inconsis-
tently omitted any independent consideration of the rule's de-
terrent purpose. Instead, the Court has employed the quasi-
criminal doctrine and excluded unlawfully obtained evidence
only in those civil actions that were punitive in nature.5 3 No
Supreme Court decision has directly considered whether the
rule's deterrent purpose might also be served in civil cases
lacking any punitive aspect.5 4 Moreover, in United States v.
pose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."). See also
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (In holding that exclusionary rule claims
could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review, the Court stated: "[the
primary justification for the exclusionary rule then is the deterrence of police
conduct that violates fourth amendment rights . . . ." Id. at 486. In this case,
however, such deterrence would be minimal, "and the substantial societal costs
of application of the rule persist with special force." Id. at 495.); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (In holding that the exclusionary rule is not
applicable in grand jury proceedings, the Court stated that "the damage to [the
grand jury] from the unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule... out-
weighs the benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect.").
52. See note 51 supra. The Supreme Court has often also referred to the
necessity of preserving "judicial integrity" as a purpose of the exclusionary
rule. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914) (to admit uncon-
stitutionally obtained evidence "would be to affirm by judicial decision a mani-
fest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution").
See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRiALs AT COMMON LAw 51 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961). Despite the view of a few Justices, however, see
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[t]he exclusionary rule.., accomplished the twin goals of enabling the judi-
ciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the
people ... that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior"),
the "preservation of judicial integrity" appears to be only a secondary benefit of
the exclusionary rule's application and not a significant balancing factor in de-
termining whether the rule should be applied in a given case. In recent cases,
the Supreme Court has determined that its examination of the good faith of the
officer to determine if the exclusionary rule's application will have a deterrent
effect is also determinative of whether judicial integrity will be harmed. If the
rule's application will have no deterrent effect, then admission of the illegally
obtained evidence will not serve to further encourage violations and hence
does not harm the court's integrity. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-
59 n.35 (1976). See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1975)
(fourth amendment retroactivity); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 n.25
(1974) (fifth amendment retroactivity).
53. See 116 U.S. at 633-34- 380 U.S. at 700-03; notes 25-30 supra and accompa-
nying text. See generally Clark, supra note 32, at 386-87.
54. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Court asserted that,
"[i] n the complex and turbulent history of the rule, the Court never has ap-
plied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding." Id. at 447. The issue of
application to civil cases, however, was being considered only as an additional
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Janis,55 the Supreme Court's most recent decision on the appli-
cation of the exclusionary rule in a noncriminal case, the Court
failed to give serious consideration to the quasi-criminal doc-
trine.5 6
The basis of the dispute between the Savina and Todd
courts over the applicability of the exclusionary rule in admin-
istrative OSHA hearings is found in their interpretations of the
Janis opinion.5 7 Janis involved a federal civil tax forfeiture
proceeding in which the IRS sought to introduce evidence of
the defendant's unreported and illegal bookmaking receipts
that had been unlawfully seized by state police officers.58 Prior
to this federal civil action, the same evidence had been ruled
inadmissible in a local criminal prosecution by reason of the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule.59 The Supreme Court, fo-
cusing on the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule,60
held that the rule did not apply in the federal civil proceed-
ing.61 After reasoning that in the local criminal prosecution the
exclusionary rule had substantially achieved its deterrent pur-
factor that, when combined with the intersovereign nature of the fourth amend-
ment violation in question, mitigated against application of the exclusionary
rule in that case. See notes 58-64 infra and accompanying text. The Janis
Court noted that it was "aware of no study on the possible deterrent effect of
excluding evidence in a civil proceeding." 428 U.S. at 452 n.22. Apparently be-
cause the precise issue was not then before the Court, however, no attempt at
intuitive analysis was made.
55. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
56. See notes 68-71 infra and accompanying text.
57. Compare text accompanying notes 75-77 infra with text accompanying
notes 78-81 infra.
58. Janis failed to file any federal wagering tax return pertaining to his
bookmaking activities. Using evidence illegally obtained by the state police,
the IRS assessed Janis for unpaid federal wagering excise taxes under section
4401 of the I.R.C., and levied on cash that had been seized by the state police
pursuant to authority granted under section 6331 of the LR.C., in partial satis-
faction of the assessment. 428 U.S. at 437. Janis filed a claim for refund of the
cash and, after the government's failure to honor this claim, filed suit in United
States District Court in California. Id. at 438. The government's claim for the
full amount of the assessment was heard as a counterclaim against Janis. See
id. at 438 & n.5. Finding that "substantially all... of the evidence upon which
the assessment was based was the result of illegally obtained evidence," Janis
v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 16,083 at 81,393 (C.D. Cal. 1973),
affd mem., No. 73-2226 (9th Cir. Jul. 22, 1974), rev'd, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the dis-
trict court ordered that the IRS' civil tax assessment be quashed and dismissed
the government's counterclaim with prejudice. See 428 U.S. at 439.
59. See 428 U.S. at 437-38.
60. See id. at 457 n.34 ('The Court has ... clarified the fact that the pri-
mary, if not the sole, function of the exclusionary rule is deterrence."), (citing,
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
531 (1975)).
61. See 428 U.S. at 459-60. See text accompanying note 76 infra.
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pose,62 the Supreme- Court concluded that "exclusion from fed-
eral civil proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state
criminal enforcement officer has not been shown to have a suf-
ficient likelihood of deterring the conduct of the state police so
that it outweighs the societal costs imposed by the exclu-
sion."63
The Supreme Court's holding in Janis involves two factors.
The first factor is the "intersovereign" character of the illegal
search: the party that conducted the illegal search and the
party that offered the fruits of that search into evidence were
separate sovereign entities.64 The Court reasoned that barring
federal authorities from introducing in civil proceedings evi-
dence that was illegally obtained by state officials would not
significantly deter state officials from future misconduct be-
cause state officials are primarily interested in the outcome of
state cases.65 In earlier cases, however, the Court had held that
the deterrence purpose of the exclusionary rule was sufficient
to justify the exclusion of evidence seized by the criminal law
enforcement officers of one sovereign in the criminal proceed-
ings of another sovereign.66 Rather than overrule the earlier
cases,67 the Janis Court distinguished them by relying on a sec-
ond factor: the civil nature of the Janis tax forfeiture proceed-
62. See id. at 448, 453-54 (explaining that the evidence would also be ex-
cluded in any federal criminal proceeding- "The additional marginal deterrence
provided by forbidding a different sovereign from using the evidence in a civil
proceeding surely does not outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule to
that situation.") (footnote omitted).
63. Id. at 454.
64. Id. at 455-60.
65. Id. at 457-58. The Court chastized the respondent, Janis, for his failure
to "critically distinguish between those cases in which the officer committing
the unconstitutional search or seizure was an agent of the sovereign that
sought to use the evidence ... and those cases . . . where the officer has no
responsibility or duty to, or agreement with, the sovereign seeking to use the
evidence." Id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
66. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (evidence ille-
gally obtained by state officials is inadmissible in federal criminal proceedings);
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 (1956) (federal courts may enjoin federal
agents from using evidence obtained illegally as the basis of testimony in state
criminal proceedings). These two decisions put an end to the "silver platter
doctrine" under which evidence that was obtained through the fourth amend-
ment violations of one sovereign was freely admissible in the courts of the
other sovereign, even though it would be excluded in the courts of the offend-
ing sovereign. See generally Galler, The Exclusion of Illegal State Evidence in
Federal Courts, 49 J. Cnn4. L. CRnInoLoGY & POL Sci. 455 (1959); Kamisar,
Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal
Courts, 43 Mum. L. REv. 1083 (1959).
67. See 428 U.S. at 448.
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ing.68 Although the civil forfeiture proceedings in Boyd and
Plymouth Sedan appear to be functionally indistinguishable
from the proceeding in Janis,69 the Janis Court mentioned
these cases only in a footnote and, without explanation, charac-
terized the former cases as quasi-criminal and the latter case
as civil.70 Apparently, the Janis Court reasoned that exclusion
of evidence in a civil case would have less deterrent effect than
exclusion of the same evidence in a criminal or quasi-criminal
case.
71
The Janis opinion is confusing because the Court failed to
explain the relationship between the intersovereign and civil
factors. This confusion could have been avoided by indicating
the weight that each had been accorded. Moreover, the Court
failed to explain the degree to which Janis was intended to
modify existing law. Although the Janis Court relied princi-
pally on the intersovereign character of the fourth amendment
violation in order to avoid application of the exclusionary
rule,7 2 it did not overrule prior Supreme Court cases that
barred intersovereign use of tainted evidence in criminal prose-
68. Id. at 458.
69. In explaining why the exclusionary rule was applied in Plymouth Se-
dan and in Boyd, but not in Janis, the Court noted that both of the former
cases involved "a proceeding for forfeiture of an article used in violation of the
criminal law." Id. at 447 n.17. This distinction relies on two assumptions: first,
that the forfeiture of money is different from the forfeiture of an "article" and,
second, that the tax forfeiture involved in Janis was not a penalty for violation
of the criminal law. On closer examination, however, neither of these assump-
tions appears convincing.
In Janis, the Court did not assert any basis for distinguishing between the
forfeiture of money and the forfeiture of an article of value. That there is no
reasonable basis for such a distinction is supported by a comparison of lower
court decisions involving money and car forfeitures. In both types of forfeit-
ures the majority of courts applied the quasi-criminal doctrine and found un-
constitutionally obtained evidence inadmissible in their respective forfeiture
proceedings. See note 36 supra.
The second assumption, that the forfeiture of money in Janis was not in-
tended as a penalty for the use of the money in violation of wagering laws, also
appears to be logically unsupportable. A tax levied for the purpose of punish-
ing someone for violation of a criminal law is punitive in its effect and, thus, the
tax proceeding is quasi-criminal in its nature. See Clark, supra note 32, at 468.
That the wagering excise tax in Janis is punitive is clear in that its primary
purpose is not to raise revenue but to seek forfeiture of goods used in violation
of wagering laws. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1967). Thus,
the tax forfeiture proceeding, like the civil forfeiture proceeding in Plymouth
Sedan, "serves as an adjunct to the enforcement of the criminal law." 428 U.S.
at 463 (Stewart, J. dissenting). See generally Clark, supra note 32, at 385-420
(distinguishing punitive and remedial laws in order to differentiate between
quasi-criminal and civil cases).
70. 428 U.S. at 447 n.17.
71. Id. at 458.
72. Id.
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cutions. Similarly, although the Court characterized Janis as a
civil case, the Court failed to repudiate its quasi-criminal doc-
trine or to explain why it was not applicable to the civil forfei-
ture proceeding involved in Janis. Thus, all that can be stated
with certainty is that Janis stands for the proposition that the
"exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in
[the] civil proceeding of one sovereign of evidence seized by a
criminal law enforcement agent of another sovereign."73 In the
Court's view, the intersovereign and civil factors existing in
Janis operate cumulatively to diminish the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule to the point where the importance of the
truth-finding function of the court outweighs it.74
In Todd, the Ninth Circuit focused exclusively on the civil
nature of the Janis case, ignoring its intersovereign aspect.
Further, the Todd court failed to consider applying the quasi-
criminal doctrine. This failure is inexplicable because the
Janis Court appeared to reassert the doctrine's vitality;75 and,
aside from failing to distinguish Janis from Boyd and Plymouth
Sedan,76 the Court gave no indication of any new limitations on
the doctrine's scope. The Todd court's citation of Janis as au-
thority for the proposition that the Supreme Court has never
applied the exclusionary rule in civil cases7 7 ignores Boyd and
Plymouth Sedan and misrepresents Janis.
Under Janis, both the intersovereign and the civil factors
must exist in order to render the exclusionary rule inapplica-
ble. In Savina, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Janis on the
basis of its intersovereign aspect and correctly concluded that,
although Janis manifests the Supreme Court's recent propen-
sity to limit application of the exclusionary rule generally,78 it
does not directly control the issue involved in Todd and
Savina.7 9
73. Id. at 459-60.
74. See id. at 458-59 & n.35.
75. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
77. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 586 F.2d 683, 689 (9th
Cir. 1978).
78. See 428 U.S. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing Janis as a
continuation of "the Court's 'business of slow strangulation of the rule' "). See
also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 550-62 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting
in a decision that limited the circumstances under which new applications of
the exclusionary rule would be retroactive in their application); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-67 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting in a decision in
which the Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceed-
ings).
79. See 594 F.2d at 1362 & n.5.
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Although the Savina court indicated that OSHA civil pen-
alties could be considered quasi-criminal sanctions,80 it did not
base its decision on the quasi-criminal doctrine. Instead, the
court examined the relationship between the exclusionary
rule's purposes-preserving judicial integrity and deterring offi-
cial lawlessness-and the effect that exclusion of evidence
would have in OSHA proceedings.81 This approach was also
taken in Janis,82 but never considered in Todd. In taking such
a functional approach, the Savina court implicitly criticized re-
liance on the quasi-criminal doctrine in fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule cases; 83 similarity of a particular case to a
traditional criminal proceeding appears to be entirely unrelated
to the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule and, therefore,
to the need to exclude evidence. Criminal and quasi-criminal
proceedings both involve important individual interests that
deserve a high degree of protection. This fact, however, does
not distinguish criminal from civil proceedings for purposes of
the exclusionary rule. The evidence potentially subject to ex-
clusion does not become less reliable simply because of the
means by which it was procured;84 thus, to admit the evidence
would not frustrate the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
Admission of the evidence does, however, fail to deter future
officials who may attempt an unreasonable search and seizure.
80. Id. at 1362 n.6.
81. Id. at 1362-63.
82. See text accompanying notes 60-63.
83. 594 F.2d at 1363.
84. In this respect, the operation of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule is unlike the exclusionary rule that accompanies the fifth amendment's
guarantee of protection from compelled self-incrimination. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Chief Justice Burger explained the distinction in these words:
A confession produced after intimidating or coercive interrogation is
inherently dubious. If a suspect's will has been overborne, a cloud
hangs over his custodial admissions; the exclusion of such statements
is based essentially on their lack of reliability. This is not the case as
to reliable evidence-a pistol, a packet of heroin, counterfeit money, or
the body of a murder victim-which may be judically declared to be
the result of an "unreasonable" search. The reliability of such evi-
dence is beyond question; its probative value is certain.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-97 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis
in original).
Because freedom from self-incrimination is a personal, constitutional right
of the accused, and because more fundamental personal interests of the ac-
cused are usually at stake in criminal and quasi-criminal cases than in civil
cases, the quasi-criminal doctrine would appear to be rationally applicable to
fifth amendment exclusionary rule cases. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661-66
(1961) (Black, J., concurring) (reading the fourth and fifth amendments to-
gether to require state courts to adhere to the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule).
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The right that exclusion of evidence seeks to protect is that of
freedom from such searches and seizures, 85 and parties to civil
and criminal actions possess that right to the same degree. The
decision to apply the exclusionary rule must, therefore, depend
in both instances, as the Savina court argues, on a balancing of
the dual interests of society in deterring future misconduct by
public officials and in punishing parties demonstrated to be lia-
ble by the tainted evidence.8 6
The logical implications of the Savina court's reasoning in-
dicate that there may often be greater utility in applying the
exclusionary rule in civil cases than in criminal cases, 87 a com-
plete reversal of the result reached under the quasi-criminal
doctrine.88 To support this contention, the two sides of the bal-
ance that the Supreme Court originally employed to develop
the exclusionary rule should be considered. On one side is the
public interest in arriving at the truth in a judicial proceeding:
the greater the weight on this side of the balance, the more
willing a court should be to admit tainted but reliable evidence.
On the other side is the public interest in deterring future mis-
conduct in similar situations: the greater the need to deter
such conduct, the greater the weight on this side of the balance
and the more willing a court should be to exclude probative ev-
idence that was unlawfully obtained.
A noncriminal characterization usually indicates that the
legislative branch has scrutinized the behavior in question and
has determined that it is not sufficiently detrimental to the
public interest to justify criminal penalties. Therefore, it can
be assumed that the public need to arrive at the truth in a civil
proceeding would usually be less compelling than in a criminal
proceeding, in which the public will generally face a greater
danger if the criminal escapes liability.89 Assuming that the ev-
85. Although earlier Supreme Court decisions on the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule considered the rule to be an individual's "basic right," see,
e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), more recent Supreme Court deci-
sions have clearly held that "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." See, e.g.,
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (footnote omitted).
86. See 594 F.2d at 1362-63; note 82 supra; Note, The Fourth Amendment
Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA. L. REv. 1314, 1345-46 (1967).
87. Contra, Comment, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil
Cases, supra note 21, at 277.
88. See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
89. See Note, supra note 86, at 1345 (if there is greater social need to use
the evidence in one situation rather than the other, the criminal is the more ur-
gent).
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idence to be excluded establishes that the defendant is guilty
of a violent crime, the Court's willingness to release a danger-
ous criminal because the evidence of his crime was obtained by
unlawful means,90 argues, a fortiori, that courts should be even
more willing to let a civil defendant, who has violated a less ur-
gent prohibition, escape liability.
While the public need for correct results is less in civil pro-
ceedings, the need for deterrence in such proceedings is just as
great as in criminal proceedings. Unreasonable and warrant-
less searches are equally intrusive whether conducted in antici-
pation of a criminal or a civil proceeding. Although it might be
argued that there is a greater need for deterrence in criminal
investigations, in which the greater public need to ascertain the
truth might cause enforcement officers to conduct a more vigor-
ous investigation, that does not seem to be persuasive in re-
spect to OSHA inspections. Criminal investigations are
generally conducted by officers who frequently make such in-
vestigations. In the vast majority of cases, it is likely that they
are motivated primarily by a desire to carry out their duties
competently. OSHA inspectors are similarly motivated in that
their exclusive responsibility is to enforce the Act through in-
vestigations of employers and places of work.9 ' The two sets of
government employees would thus appear to have comparable
incentives to conduct intrusive searches in the effort to dis-
cover violators.92
90. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (murder con-
viction reversed because evidence used against defendant was obtained on the
basis of a defective search warrant). Such results explain much of the current
criticism of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Over the years, the strains
imposed by reality, in terms of the costs to society and the bizarre miscarriages
of justice that have been experienced because of the exclusion of reliable evi-
dence.. ., have led the Court to vacillate as to the rational for deliberate exclu-
sion of truth from the factfinding process."). The danger that such cases
present to the public has led one commentator to suggest that the rule should
not apply "in the most serious cases-treason, espionage, murder, armed rob-
bery, and kidnapping." Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1027, 1046 (1974).
91. See also note 111 and accompanying text.
92. It might also be argued that, apart from the greater public need, there
is greater public opinion pressure on police to ascertain the truth in criminal
cases that might cause police officers to conduct more rigorous investigations.
In most criminal cases, however, the public's awareness of the crime is no
greater than it is of most OSHA violations. Many of the major Supreme Court
cases concerning the exclusionary rule involved low visibility, nonviolent of-
fenses. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (criminal prosecution for
possession of obscene materials); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)
(criminal prosecution for using the federal mails to transmit lottery ticket);
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Examination of the second articulated purpose behind the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule, preservation of judicial
integrity,93 reveals similar arguments for the use of the exclu-
sionary rule in administrative proceedings. Although the quasi-
criminal doctrine makes application of the exclusionary rule
dependent on the punitive character of the liability that may be
incurred, preservation of judicial integrity would be best served
by excluding illegally obtained evidence in cases in which the
public identifies more strongly with the defendant who was
subject to the illegal search. Presumably, the public would
therefore perceive injustice more strongly were such tainted
evidence admitted. Such defendants would undoubtedly tend
to be those guilty of mere civil offenses. 94
Thus, .if courts follow the reasoning of Savina, greater use
of the exclusionary rule should occur in civil cases.95 Although
this result may initially appear to be contrary to the fourth
amendment's historic role, it comports with the original pur-
pose envisioned by the drafters of the amendment. Although
the official abuses that gave rise to the fourth amendment did
involve searches in criminal investigations, the main impetus
for the amendment was the sovereign's intrusions into the
business establishments of merchants to confirm full payment
of duties owed the Crown.9 6
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (civil prosecution for failing to de-
clare the importation of thirty-five cases of glass).
Also, in the more serious, violent crimes that generate greater public con-
cern the Supreme Court has allowed certain exceptions to the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirements to avoid unreasonably restricting the ability of
police officers to both promptly and effectively resolve those crimes and remain
within constitutional limitations. See LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the
Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the Quagmire, 8 CRIM. L. BUL.. 9 (1972).
93. See note 52 supra (in the view of the majority, judicial integrity consid-
erations involve essentially the same inquiry as deterrence purpose considera-
tions).
94. See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
95. The Savina court concentrated on the deterrence value of applying the
exclusionary rule to evidence resulting from OSHA searches and did not ex-
amine the relative truth-ascertainment costs of excluding evidence in OSHA
versus criminal cases. The reasoning in Savina, however, would suggest the
value of the exclusionary rule in civil cases to have been consistently underes-
timated. Continued use of Janis's balancing should result in wider application
of the exclusionary rule in civil cases.
96. The Supreme Court noted this in Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 311 (footnotes
omitted):
The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colo-
nies immediately preceding the Revolution. The particular offensive-
ness it engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen
whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the
several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colo-
nists.
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The Savina approach to fourth amendment exclusionary
rule questions is also important insofar as there has been a
transfer of many law enforcement functions from traditional
police agencies to other government agencies and officials. 97
This trend is likely to accelerate in the future.98 In the context
of regulatory agencies, applying the exclusionary rule when the
purposes of the rule are achieved is a better safeguard of the
privacy protections of the fourth amendment than either the
Todd court's empty classification of the regulatory scheme as
either civil or criminal,99 or the quasi-criminal doctrine. 0 An
effective safeguard is necessary because the granting of police
search functions to administrative agencies and the increasing
regulatory powers of government creates a danger of unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion. In addition, use of the artificial
classification system of Todd would lead to the anomalous situ-
ation "that a man suspected of crime has a right to protection
against search... without a warrant, [while] a man not sus-
pected of crime has no such protection."'1o By shifting the fo-
cus of judicial scrutiny in exclusionary rule cases from the type
of case to the purposes of the exclusionary rule, Savina en-
sures that officials in civil proceedings have no greater power to
impose upon privacy than have police officials in criminal mat-
ters.102
Savina may appear out of step with the recent trend to
mitigate the apparent harshness of the exclusionary rule.
Savina represents an expansion of the rule; in contrast, recent
Supreme Court cases have tended to limit its scope. 103 The
most recent attacks on the scope of the exclusionary rule,104
See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOuRTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 55 (1937).
97. See generally Clark, supra note 27, at 381-82 & n.6.
98. See id. at 381 n.6.
99. See notes 42-43, 75-77 supra and accompanying text.
100. See notes 83-88 supra and accompanying text.
101. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949), a ld on
other grounds, 339 U.S. 1 (1950)).
102. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976) (See text ac-
companying note 64 supra); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481-82 (1976) ("where
the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a state prisoner be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in
an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at trial"); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-55 (1974) (a witness summoned to appear and testify
before a grand jury may not refuse to answer questions on the ground that they
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure).
104. See, e.g., cases cited note 103 supra; Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a
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however, have evinced the same concern for fulfillment of the
rule's deterrence purpose that is characteristic of Savina.0 5
Two examples are the general refusal to extend the rule to ex-
clude evidence illegally obtained through searches conducted
by private parties106 and the criticism of the exclusion of the
fruits of intersovereign fourth amendment violations that is im-
plicit in Janis.107 The potential private violator has been
Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALiF. L. REv. 929, 951-54 (1965); Kaplan, note
90 supra; LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Mak-
ing and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L REV. 987 (1965);
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L REv.
665 (1970); Wilson & Alprin, Controlling Police Conduct: Alternatives to the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 36 L. & CoNrEmp. PRoB. 488 (1971). Cf. Amsterdam, Perspec-
tives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MmN. L. REv. 349, 429-30 (1974) (criticizing
the alternative deterrent schemes of the critics of the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule and concluding that the rule is the only practical remedy: "[W]e
shall have airings of police searches and seizures on suppression motions or
not at all").
105. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974).
106. Evidence illegally seized by private persons is generally admitted into
evidence in civil cases between private parties both because the fourth amend-
ment's language has been interpreted to apply only to the acts of government
agents, see note 16 supra, and because the search victim has alternative reme-
dies against a private trespasser that serve the deterrent purpose behind the
exclusionary rule with greater efficacy. See, e.g., Drew v. International Bhd. of
Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446, 449 (D.C. 1965) (civil suit for
breach of employment contract: evidence illegally seized by private employer
was admissible); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 42, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85, 203
N.E.2d 481, 483 (1964) (evidence of wife's infidelity found by husband when he
broke into her home admitted in divorce action); Walker v. Penner, 190 Or. 542,
548, 227 P.2d 316, 318-19 (1951) (holding that trial court erred in excluding evi-
dence illegally obtained by plaintiffs friend in a personal injury action). But cf.
Williams v. Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 160, 37 Ohio Op. 2d 224, 227, 221 N.E. 2d
622, 626 (1966) (fourth amendment right was equally applicable against private
individuals as it was against the government in a divorce action); Day & Zim-
mermann, Inc. v. Strickland, 483 S.W.2d 541, 546-47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (under
rule 167, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, it was within judge's discretion to ex-
clude testimony based on unauthorized inspection by plaintiff's witness).
Based on the rationale that the fourth amendment is only designed to re-
strain government officials from conducting illegal searches and seizures, evi-
dence illegally seized by private persons and then turned over to the
government has been admitted even in criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Bur-
deau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921) (evidence stolen by private individual
with no connection to the government was admissible in a criminal prosecu-
tion). See also NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360, 363-64 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1969) (evidence seized by private individual with no
connection to the government was admissible in NLRB hearing); United States
v. Stonehill, 420 F. Supp. 46, 53 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (evidence seized by Philippine
government and private individual without direction or instigation by U.S. offi-
cials admissible in civil tax lien case); Comment, Constitutional Law: Evidence
Obtained Through a Private Unreasonable Search and Seizure Inadmissible in
a Civil Action, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1119 (1962); secondary sources cited in note 21
supra.
107. See notes 58-74 supra and accompanying text.
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thought to be sufficiently deterred by the availability of a pri-
vate trespass action to the search victim, 0 8 and the potential
intersovereign violator has been thought to be sufficiently de-
terred by the knowledge that evidence so gained will be ex-
cluded from criminal prosecutions in his own jurisdiction--"the
offending officer's zone of primary interest." 0 9 No such alter-
native deterrent device, however, exists in the area of OSHA
inspections or similar administrative searches. In most cases,
the Secretary of Labor and his agents still enjoy sovereign im-
munity from private trespass suits under the Federal Tort
Claims Act,11o and, in most cases, the warrantless administra-
tive investigator has no motivation other than to enforce a civil
penalty in the courts."' The deterrence-oriented reasoning of
108. See Comment, supra note 106, at 1124.
109. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976); see note 65 supra and
accompanying text.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). The victim of a warrantless administrative
search would presumably have the same right to institute an action to recover
damages as the victim of a warrantless criminal search. Section 2680 provides
that the exception to sovereign immunity for certain intentional torts applies to
''any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches,
[or] to seize evidence" without mention of criminal or civil jurisdiction. Such
actions have been brought under the rule of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (recognizing an implied right to damages under
the Constitution against individual federal officers found to have conducted an
illegal search), see, e.g., Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978). Similar suits may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976). The limitations on such suits, however, have been well documented by
the commentators as rendering these actions of little use in all but the most
extreme circumstances. See, e.g., Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals
to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct,
87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978); Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police
Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MwN. L. REv. 991 (1975); Note, Accounta-
bility for Government Misconduct Limiting Qualified Immunity and the Good
Faith Defense, 49 TEMP. L.Q. 938 (1976). Perhaps the most severe limitation is
the defense that the investigating officer had a reasonable good faith belief that
his conduct was lawful Although never explicitly approved by the Supreme
Court, this defense has been uniformly accepted by lower courts, see Com-
ment, Federal Tort Claims Act: Liability of United States for Torts Committed
in Good Faith by Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 63 MnN. L REv. 1293, 1297
n.21 (1979), despite widespread criticism by the commentators. See Newman,
supra, at 460-62; Theis, supra, at 1008-09; Note, supra, at 951-55; Comment,
supra, at 1297 & n.22. None of these criticisms leveled in the criminal context
appear any less valid in the context of administrative searches, see, e.g., Am-
sterdam, supra note 104, at 429.
111. In enforcing his congressional mandate "to assure so far as possible
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working condi-
tions and to preserve our human resources," 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976), the Sec-
retary proceeds primarily through civil penalties. See 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
OSHA provides for criminal sanctions in only three specific circumstances: (1)
when any person given unauthorized advance warning of an inspection; (2)
when any person knowingly makes a false statement on documents filed in
compliance with OSHA regulations; and (3) when a willful violation of OSHA
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the most recent cases, therefore, supports the Savina result.
No one would seriously assert that the exclusionary rule is
the optimal deterrent device. Many have questioned the extent
of its deterrent effect.11 2 Moreover, the rule carries with it the
countervailing evil of allowing wrongdoers to escape liability
for their acts. Unfortunately, however, the exclusionary rule is
the only practical deterrent device available in a variety of situ-
ations," 3 and the majority of the Supreme Court has so far de-
clined to abandon it in those situations in which a deterrent
effect is most likely to be present. The Savina court has
pointed out that an unlawful administrative search resulting in
a civil penalty, prosecuted by the same agency that conducted
the search, is among the strongest cases for application of the
rule. Rejection of the quasi-criminal doctrine and adoption of
the Savina court's deterrence-oriented analysis would go far
toward ensuring the preservation of fourth amendment rights.
This result will become more important as administrative
searches and civil penalties become more common.
regulations cause the death of an employee. Id. at § 666(e)-(g). None of these
circumstances, however, are applicable to the violations found in the Savina
case. OSHA inspectors, in performing their duties, generally are seeking to en-
force OSHA's regulations thr6ugh civil penalties. Thus, the knowledge that if
they unexpectedly uncover evidence of a criminal violation, then that evidence
would be inadmissible in a criminal proceeding, appears too remote a likeli-
hood to serve as an effective deterrent.
112. See, e.g., cases cited in note 103 supra; articles cited in note 104 supra,-
cf. Brennan dissent cited in note 78 supra (lamenting the Court's slow stran-
gulation of the exclusionary rule). But cf. Amsterdam, supra note 104 (arguing
that the exclusionary rule is the only viable method of deterring unlawful
searches).
113. See Amsterdam, supra note 104.
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